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Japanese Banks are riding a wave of consolidation in the international financial industry as they strive to 
regain a competitive edge and overcome billions of dollars in bad loans made in the 1980s. Unfolding bank 
reforms and increasing foreign competition are shifting the rules of the games for Japanese banks, which must 
also deal with new Internet-led technological advances. On May 2, 2000, the Center on Japanese 
Economy and Business, Columbia University, and the Japan Society of New York, together with the support of 
the G7 Group, Inc., held a half-day international conference featuring leaders from both the private and 
public banking sectors in Japan and the United States. Drawing on the U.S. as well as the Japanese experi-
ence, discussions focused on business and policy aspects of bank consolidation, as well as the changing regula-
tory environment. The impact of the Big Bang, the rapid consolidation within the industry, the Internet, and 
the emergence of new competitors, including increased foreign competition, were explored by distinguished 
American and Japanese speakers. Excerpts of their presentations are presented below along with highlights 
of the intra-panel and audience discussions. 
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T h e global financial system is 
b i -modal . In Europe, the Uni ted 
States, and places such as 
Singapore and Brazil, the 
banking, insurance, a n d 
brokerage businesses serve their 
societies quite well. T h e y are 
well-capitalized , seemingly well 
managed , and record spectacular 
returns . In the rest of the wor ld , 
however, these same businesses 
are fundamental ly paralyzed. 
The i r balance sheets contain a 
large propor t ion of non-
performing loans, their earnings 
power is fundamentally 
impaired, and their ability to 
serve customers and extend new 
facilities is significantly limited . 
This is a serious problem for the 
economic growth and deve lop-
men t of a great majority of 
countries , from Japan, Korea, 
Tha i land , and Indonesia to 
Mexico, Turkey, and Po land, 
and then more broadly Russia 
and China . 
In the healthy parr of the 
world, fundamental economic 
forces are driving rapid consolida-
tions of the industry. Since world 
demand for financial services is 
relatively predictable, top-line 
revenue growth in the industry 
has been and will continue to be 
stable. Also clear economies of 
scale are associated with being in 
a top-tier position, thus driving 
suppliers in Nor th America, 
Europe, Japan, and elsewhere to 
improve their market improve : positron 
through consolidation . 
T h e continued development 
of capital markets also affects the 
intermediary and supplier insti-
tutions surrounding them . T h e 
development of the Euro, for 
example, is causing individual 
capital markets of member states 
to come together, as the joining 
of the British and German stock 
exchanges well illustrates. 
T h e Internet will also have a 
profound impact on the nature 
of capital markets as well as on 
the structure and functioning of 
financial insti tutions . By facili-
tat ing the communica t ion that 
leads to a transaction, the 
Internet reduces costs and 
improves the effectiveness of 
financial institutions. This will 
lead to the continued structural 
adjustment of institutions in the 
industry. The experience of 
Citigroup, for example, shows 
how an institution can success-
fully turn into a single supplier 
of commercial banking, Tradi-
tional investment banking, and 
capital markets skills. To the 
extent that this model turns out 
to be a profitable one, other 
institutions will begin to copy it. 
For countries that are experi-
encing problems with their 
financial industry a tension is 
revealed between the funda-
mental rules of the market and 
the relationships that derive 
from society and its traditions. 
It is this tension between rules 
and relationships that has 
described the evolution of the 
banking system in Japan and 
other countries. 
The first rule is that losses 
must be recognized. When a 
country experiences severe 
economic discontinuity, finan-
cial institutions can find them-
selves with balance sheets 
containing mispriced assets. 
Under a mark-to-market philos-
ophy, these institutions will 
experience tremendous losses. In 
Japan's post-bubble economy, 
for example, assets on the 
balance sheets of Japanese banks 
and insurance companies were 
mispriced. Over the last decade, 
t he Japanese banking system has 
written off approximately 13 
percent of its total assets, with 
more write-offs still to come. 
The banks are absorbing these 
losses through earnings and 
hidden reserves, bur it is taking 
a long time, and in the mean-
time the institutions are unable 
to perform their normal func-
tion in society. 
The second rule is to mark 
assets to market, in other words 
to develop a secondary market 
that attracts new capital at the 
price level at which the assets 
have come off the balance 
sheet. This has not yet 
happened in Japan. 
Once the system has moved 
into a more profitable position, 
the third rule is for individual 
institutions to foster a strong 
sense of vision and purpose. 
Now what about relation-
ships? Americans embrace the 
idea that it is a cold, hostile 
world out there, and by and 
large banks are expected to live 
by the rules. Those who cannot 
are absorbed by others. In other 
societies, however, the govern-
ment may actually inject capital 
into the banking system. This 
puts the government in a posi-
tion where it can force consoli-
dations or market openings. In 
such cases one societal rule is 
clear: the government eventually 
owns the deposit risks. No 
modern government will allow 
depositors to take significant 
losses in the financial sector. 
In sum, the path that lies 
ahead for Japan is very similar 
to that of any other country 
with a deeply troubled financial 
system. It must recognize its 
losses through the establishment 
of a robust secondary market for 
financial assets. There has been 
an injection of capital from the 
Japanese government and a 
market opening that has allowed 
foreign investors and non-tradi-
tional sources of financial 
services to enter the market 
place. Ultimately, to play an 
appropriate role in the world, 
Japan's banking system must 
become profitable, with a sense 
of vision and purpose. 
DISCUSSION 
Q : How do Japan's low interest 
rates impact its willingness to 
restructure? 
Reed: Interest rates are 
nothing but the value of time. 
When interest rates are high, 
banks with a non-performing 
portfolio will go bankrupt in 
two or three months. However, 
in an environment of extremely 
low interest rates, banks are not 
forced to move quickly. They 
have the luxury of time because 
there is no opportunity cost. 
Q: How were American banks 
convinced of the need to write 
down their non-performing 
loans in order to restore their 
profitability? 
R e e d : Each month we were 
forced to mark-to-market every 
real individual estate loan, and it 
was an aggressive market in a 
very difficult regulatory environ-
ment. This is where relation-
ships can come into play. In 
other societies it is difficult for 
regulators to be as aggressive 
because the financial institutions 
are more deeply embedded in 
the structure of the society. 
German banks, for example, 
found it very difficult to recog-
nize their exposure to Russia in 
part because the German 
government had encouraged 
them to lend to Russia and 
changing the rules was complex. 
Q: What is the role of gover-
nance in speeding recovery? 
R e e d : In the case of Citibank, 
the Board played an extremely 
important and constructive role. 
Although the directors believed 
that management had properly 
recognized the full extent of the 
difficulties, and that we had 
made adequate plans for dealing 
with the problems, they did not 
feel that management was 
capable of carrying out the 
corrective action. 
We agreed to make the neces-
sary management and structural 
changes. We created a 
Committee of the Board that 
monitored management behavior 
on a monthly basis, and we were 
successful. In our case, the Board 
was comprised of all external 
directors, and they were more 
than willing to challenge me. 
This kind of thing is impossible 
to do with a Board that is 
completely internal of does not 
believe that they are fundamen-
tally responsible for the perfor-
mance of the institution. 
TIMOTHY COLLINS 
Senior Managing Director and CEO, 
Ripplewood Holdings 
The Long-Term Credit 
Bank's strategy in the United 
States has been industry-focused 
and premised exclusively on our 
ability to use private capital as a 
catalyst for value creation. We 
always partner with senior 
industry executives who validate 
a strategy and then lead its 
execution. We are applying this 
same "measure twice and cut 
once" style of investing to our 
activities in Japan. 
Early on we identified several 
changes required in the Japanese 
financial system. The first step 
was to restore confidence. The 
Japanese government's policies 
over the last 18 months have 
been quite successful in 
enhancing competence in the 
system. The next big challenge 
is to retune the capital allocation 
process and to acquire the requi-
site skills. 
One of the major antecedents 
of Japan's financial crisis was the 
breakdown in its credit analysis 
process. Basically, capital was 
allocated to projects and compa-
nies that had little possibility of 
providing an adequate return. 
Today we see the opposite trend 
occurring: many worthy projects 
are not being financed. 
Ultimately, restoring economic 
health will require the restruc-
turing of troubled corporate 
borrowers, 
Japan's economic system is 
crumbling under the weight of 
inappropriate and outdated 
policies. In the immediate 
postwar period, capital and 
skilled labor were the principal 
constraints to growth. Low-cost 
debt provided the necessary 
capital and through increased 
market share Japan became the 
most leveraged economy in the 
world. Unfortunately, these 
policies worked to create enter-
prises that operated with a 
dangerous combination of high 
fixed costs and high fixed charge 
payments, in many cases, 
projects with expected returns 
of 4 to 5 percent actually lost 
money. The real estate bubble 
further exaggerated the misallo-
cation of resources to projects 
that had no hope of earning 
their cost of capital. 
In contrast, the United Stales 
suffered decades of bitter labor-
management relations and a 
slide in engineering and manu-
facturing that led to low quality 
processes and products. As a 
result of tax cuts, tight monetary 
policy, deregulation, corporate 
downsizing and the birth of the 
new information enterprises, a 
resurgence in corporate profits 
refueled a robust expansion. 
Japanese companies, on the 
other hand, still use leading-
edge processes to make world 
class products, and their state-
of-the-art plants are character-
ized by relatively harmonious 
labor relations. Under these 
circumstances, replicating the 
U.S. experience might well lead 
to worker backlash, reversal of 
public confidence, disrupted 
supplier relationships, and pres-
sures for the government to 
create a large government safety 
net. In an economy where entre-
preneurship and risk capital are 
greatly needed, fewer would be 
willing to take risks. In an 
economy where increased 
consumer spending is needed, 
consumers would be less 
inclined to spend, 
Japanese government, busi-
nesses, and other stakeholders 
have shown a willingness to 
adapt principles that have 
worked elsewhere. The govern-
ment's role so far has been 
pivotal and has set the course. 
The next round must be led by 
the corporate sector, entrepre-
neurs, and investors. The key to 
the health of the Japanese finan-
cial system is the enhanced prof-
itability of non-financial enter-
prises. There are many positive 
signs: expenditures on informa-
tion technology have grown, 
entrepreneurship is increasing, 
and the Internet is poised to 
have a large impact on Japan. 
The Japanese economy must 
now find its own model for 
economic resurgence, and the 
LTCB is committed to playing 
an important role. We are 
investing heavily in technology 
and training to enhance the 
skill base of our current profes-
sional staff. Our goal is to 
provide capital, advice, and 
other financial products and 
services that add value to our 
corporate and retail customers. 
In addition, we are charged by 
our partners and investors to 
manage our assets prudently. 
We have three priorities: first, 
to determine how best to manage 
our current asset portfolio; 
second, to better understand the 
requirements of our existing 
customers: and third, to build 
the skills needed to deliver those 
products and services efficiently 
and effectively. 
DISCUSSION 
Q : What is the timeline for 
restructuring the LTCB? 
C o l l i n s : Restructuring has 
already begun. From a financial 
point of view we have an enor-
mously sound balance sheet. We 
have enormous liquidity and 
benefit from a relationship with 
the DIC that protects us from 
future asset erosion. So we can 
be very aggressive in meeting 
the service requests of our 
customers. Although we have 
only been at the helm for seven 
or eight weeks, we have already 
brought in a number of new 
and very talented technical 
experts in MIS, credit analysis 
and restructuring, and real 
estate. It is a multi-sphere, 
multi-stage project that will 
evolve and restructure indefi-
nitely into the future. 
SHOJI NOGUCHI 
General Manager and Managing 
Director, Industrial Bank of Japan 
The merger of the Industrial 
Bank of Japan (IBJ), Fuji Bank, 
and Daiichi Kangyo Bank 
(DKB) was intended to ensure 
our survival as key players in the 
global financial services industry. 
The merger had several positive 
results, including streamlining 
and cost reduction (i.e., 
personnel were cut by 20 
percent, and branches were 
reduced from 778 to 548), and 
strengthening our presence in the 
Japanese retail business. Some 37 
percent of our projected profit in 
the year 2005 is expected to 
come from this business. 
Together our institutions 
expect to pursue a range of new 
business opportunities, 
including both wholesale and 
investment banking. Although 
equity underwriting has only 
been permitted quite recently, 
we have strengthened this capa-
bility as well. Mergers and 
acquisitions represent another 
recent and growing area of busi-
ness. E-business is also very 
strong in Japan, especially busi-
ness to consumers. IBJ has 
launched a number of successful 
efforts in the business to busi-
ness market as well. And since 
many of these new lines of busi-
ness create fees instead of 
spreads, we have a new, 
healthier business model with 
less risk of default. 
We have learned a great deal 
here in the United States and 
these lessons will be integrated 
into the Japanese financial 
market in the neat future. 
Through the consolidation of 
our three banks we hope to 
realize important synergies in 
many of these new areas. We are 
working diligently to accelerate 
the speed of our integration. 
YUKIKO OHARA 
Banking Analyst, Ito Yokado 
According to a statement 
made by John Reed, "U.S. banks 
decided to merge, or consolidate 
with other banks when they 
were strongest. But for some 
reason, Japanese banks decide to 
merge o r conso l ida te w h e n they 
are weaker or weakest." This 
difference may very well capture 
what is wrong with the Japanese 
banking sector. 
An analyst examining a 
merger in the U.S . banking 
sector knows exactly which 
CEO will assume leadership and 
what business model the consol-
idation will follow. Even more 
importantly, before the merger 
or consolidation takes place, 
U.S. banks have already finished 
their restructuring process. 
When a merger occurs in Japan, 
however, many of the institu-
t i o n a l f u n d a m e n t a l s a r e s t i l l 
weak, and it is not unusual for 
the banks to spend another two 
years of more restructuring, 
deciding on a business model, 
and choosing a permanent 
CEO. Under these circum-
stances it is very difficult for the 
consolidated organization to 
realize its potential strength. 
The purpose of establishing a 
bank is to meet the needs of 
customers, and Ito Yokado 
Group's goal is to do just that. 
Famous in Japan for being the 
strongest retail company, the 
group operates convenience 
stores (7-Elevens) and restaurant 
chains (Dennys Japan). O f its 
approximately 10,000 outlets, 
some 8,200 are 7-Elevens in 
Japan. According to one survey, 
90 percent of the Ito Yokado 
Group's customers would like 
more access to financial services 
in the store, such as the conve-
nience of paying their public 
utility bills at the 7-Eleven 
counter. The Ito Yokado Bank 
p l a n s t o provide more of these 
kinds of services. 
The business model of this 
new bank will follow three 
steps. The first is to establish a 
safe, open, and efficient settle-
ment infrastructure by setting 
up 6,000 to 8,000 ATMs. The 
second step involves the intro-
duction of a card business that 
connects many kinds of finan-
cial institutions and functional 
or settlement services. The third 
combines this real ATM 
network with a virtual In ternet 
network so that either party can 
access the ATM service. In sum, 
the goal is to launch a settle-
ment-service retail banking 
system that is driven by real 
consumer needs. 
AKINARI HORII 
General Manager, America's 
Division, Bank of Japan 
What we are witnessing in 
the consolidation and restruc-
turing of Japan's banking system 
is not an end, but a beginning. 
Whether or not it will lead to a 
sound, healthy banking industry 
remains to be seen. It depends in 
part on our ability to remove a 
large amount of non-performing 
assets from our balance sheet. 
But another formidable task 
remains before us as well: how to 
improve profitability on our 
income statements. 
Consolidation is certainly 
one way to reduce costs. 
However, wi th regard to over 
head and other expenses, 
Japanese banks actually outper-
form their U.S. counterparts 
with regard to overhead and 
other expenses. Moreover, 
Japans recent bank mergers 
suggest trends toward increased 
economic health rather than 
weakness. In all cases, scheduled 
workforce reductions of merging 
Japanese banks exceed those of 
merging American banks in the 
early 1990s. 
The weakness of Japanese 
banks lies more on the revenue 
side. First, there is the issue of 
extending credit analysis beyond 
the simple matter of collateral 
(or land). Hopefully NTCB will 
help establish the practice of 
lending at a slightly higher rate 
to borrowers without collateral. 
Second, there is the formidable 
stumbling block of seventy tril-
lion yen in loans made by 
governmental housing corpora-
tions. This is a handicap to 
Japanese banks when they 
compete in the market place for 
fair-priced lending. 
To conclude, the govern-
ment's structural reforms must 
move forward hand-in-hand 
with private-sector initiatives to 
improve Japan's banking and 
financial systems. 
DISCUSSION 
Q : Should the Japanese govern-
ment phase out its official finan-
cial institutions, including the 
post office savings system? 
Ho r i i : Reform has actually 
begun. In the past, all money 
collected from the public sector 
through the postal savings 
system and the government 
pension fund was transferred to 
the Ministry of Finance Loan 
Trust Fund and then on for 
lending to other government 
financial institutions. 
Increasingly market elements are 
being introduced into this 
system. This should result in 
some pressure on government 
institutions to lend at higher, 
market-related interest rates, 
The government's large budget 
deficit is likely to create even 
more political pressure for 
reform of the public sector 
financial systems. 
Q : Is there any movement 
towards adopting corporate 
governance reforms in Japanese 
banks? 
N o g u c h i : Corpora te gover-
nance is certainly a key issue. 
Another is the cultural barrier of 
language. A first step may be to 
seek the advice of an external 
advisory board. A second may 
be organizing an outside board 
of directors, as long as the indi-
vidual directors are each of high 
quality. 
Ho r i i : At the same time, bank 
regulators, auditors and share-
holders are placing increased 
emphasis on improved corporate 
performance. During the past 
12 months, many of the shares 
owned under the co- and cross-
share holding systems have been 
bought by American and 
European investors who are very 
much interested in return on 
investment. 
Ohara: From an analyst's 
perspective, management's eval-
uation and compensation 
should be based on daily oper-
ating performance. This will 
focus all managers and corporate 
leaders on the success of the 
operation. In this way, if they do 
not act responsibly they will be 
held accountable. 
P a t r i c k : We make an 
American mistake by focusing 
too much on the issue of 
outside board directors. As Mr. 
Horii and Ms. Ohara have 
pointed out, the more impor-
tant issues are those that will 
change management behavior, 
including performance pressures 
for profitability as reflected in 
stock market price. In particular, 
these include auditing and 
consolidated bookkeeping, 
disclosure requirements, and a 
tougher supervisory and regula-
tory envi ronment . 
TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER 
Under Secretary of the Treasury 
for International Affairs 
The most important factor 
in determining the prospects of 
a more durable Japanese finan-
cial system will be an improved 
performance of the real 
economy. A strong recovery will 
help provide the cushion neces-
sary to ease the substantial 
restructuring that is still neces-
sary in the system as a whole. It 
will depend on a number of 
factors: the balance of macro-
economic policies; the scope 
and depth of the broader 
processes of structural reform; 
and ongoing efforts to reform 
the financial system. 
Macro-economic policy 
appears to be directed at 
strengthening domestic demand, 
until a stronger, more durable 
recovery is in place. This will 
probably require further stim-
ulus measures later in the year: 
Japan also faces a formidable 
medium- to long-term fiscal 
problem. However, with the low 
net debt held by the public 
sector, the greatest challenge will 
be a failure to generate growth 
or another premature effort at 
consolidation. The central bank 
will want to maintain a fairly 
accommodative stance until the 
risks of deflationary pressures 
have been dispelled. 
The prospects for broader 
structural reform will also be 
increasingly critical, in particular 
Japan's capacity to adjust to the 
challenges of integration and to 
take advantage of emerging tech-
nologies. Evidence suggests that 
significant restructuring is now 
underway: manufactured imports 
are almost double the share of 
domestic sales that they were 
fifteen years ago; foreign direct 
investment is up; and there is a 
substantial foreign presence in 
over half of the auto-sector as 
well as a set of high-profile acqui-
sitions in the financial and other 
sectors. 
As a result, the gap has 
narrowed between Japanese 
prices and world prices. 
Bankruptcies have been rising 
even as the economy is trying to 
recover, which suggests that a 
broader process of adjustment is 
underway. Investments are 
growing very rapidly in the so-
called new economy sectors, and 
there are signs of increased labor 
market activity. 
Yet, Japan remains less open 
than other major industrial 
countries. In large parts of the 
economy, regulations are 
sustaining the dominant 
domestic competitors and 
preventing their exposure to 
foreign or any other competi 
tion. For example, because of 
high telecom charges, Japanese 
consumers pay two to three 
times what consumers in other 
countries pay for access to the 
Internet. In this sense, Japan is 
still defined by old pressures to 
sustain the weak at the expense 
of the whole—to moderate 
competition, to manage pres-
sures for change, and to main-
tain the stability of the firm. No 
one knows the degree to which 
these arrangements can be 
sustained in a world where 
economic growth is primarily 
dependent upon resilience and 
flexibility, tolerance for failure, 
and the ability to deliver capital 
and labor resources where they 
can be used most efficiently. 
The Japanese financial sector 
once served as a reliable prism 
through which to view the 
features of the Japanese economy 
as a whole. The system was 
highly regulated and relatively 
closed to new entrants, both 
foreign and domestic. Under the 
convoy system, no bank was too 
small to be saved from failure. 
An elaborate system of controls 
and approval requirements 
guided the flow of cross-border 
capital movements. Disclosure 
was discouraged, and any differ-
entiation in performance was 
masked. 
Over the past decade, much 
of this landscape has fundamen-
tally transformed. Change has 
come partly as a result of the 
recognition that the old system 
was poorly suited to the chal-
lenges of Japan today and partly 
as a result of the pressures of the 
financial crisis. Today's system is 
more open to competition and 
innovation, less segmented, more 
t ransparent , and somewha t less 
bank dominated. These changes 
have been complemented by a 
broad array of impressive steps 
to strengthen and restructure the 
banking system. 
Yet Japan is still at the very 
early stages of dealing with its 
financial problems and the 
cumulative cost of a decade of 
gradualism and forbearance. 
The most important chal-
lenges ahead include: 
Accelerating asset disposal 
and the corporate restructuring 
process. The Japanese financial 
system is still sitting on an 
extraordinary amount of non 
performing loans. Tying up 
capital and resources in idle and 
poorly managed assets presents a 
potentially significant burden on 
the system and the economy as 
a whole. It contributes to a 
greater risk premium on finan-
cial institutions than would 
otherwise exist; it operates as a 
large overhang of pressure on 
some asset markets; and it 
increases the ultimate fiscal costs 
of the government's intervention 
in the financial sector. 
Strengthening disclosure. 
Japanese authorities still permit 
a variety of accounting disclo-
sure practices that enable 
Japanese institutions to overstate 
the level and quality of capital, 
loans and other assets on the 
books. This engenders a level of 
uncertainty about the under-
lying financial condition of 
institutions that carries poten-
tially significant costs to the 
system. 
Improving the supervisory 
framework. The present regula-
tory and supervisory system can 
use greater discretion in inter-
vening for weakening banks, 
forcing greater disclosure, and 
using prompt corrective action. 
The resolution mechanism still 
has not been applied to the 
ongoing challenge of dealing 
with weaker institutions. Going 
forward, the new supervisory 
authorities and regulators will 
have to learn to deal with the 
increasing complexity and global 
nature of financial institutions. 
Effective supervision now 
requires the encouragement of 
systems that allow firms to 
measure and control their global 
risk across entities. 
Exploring new areas for 
innovation and competition. 
Liberalization of the domestic 
system and the old foreign 
exchange law has been accompa-
nied by a substantial increase in 
the presence of foreign financial 
institutions. In many areas, the 
extent of progress has signifi-
cantly exceeded the commit-
ments. Looking ahead, the most 
important areas for further 
progress lie in the pension fund 
business and in the broader fair-
ness and transparency of the 
regulatory process. 
Looking across emerging 
Asia we can see many successful 
examples of recovery based on 
aggressive efforts to reform and 
strengthen the financial system. 
These efforts contrast dramati-
cally with the gradualist 
approach adopted by Japan. 
Nevertheless there is renewed 
hope that a greater recognition 
of the costs of past delays will 
prevent an early loss of 
momentum on financial reform. 
This is important to Japan and 
important to us. Japan's ability 
to take advantage of the techno-
logical change that offers much 
higher rates of growth depends 
importantly on the strength and 
resilience of its financial system. 
DISCUSSION 
Q : What advice would you give 
to Japanese politicians who may 
not understand how costly 
incrementalism is for the 
Japanese banking system? 
Geithner: Financial reform 
policy will be better the more 
removed it is from politics. 
Japan has some highly compe-
tent mandarins who are quire 
capable of synthesizing best 
practices from other experiences 
and applying them to Japan. My 
advice would be to give Japan's 
supervisors and regulators the 
power to act, insulate them 
from industry pressures to slow 
down the pace of change, and 
then hold them accountable for 
fixing the system. 
Q: What role did the U.S.-
Japan financial negotiations play 
in fostering positive change in 
Japan's financial scene? 
G e i t h n e r : I would be reluc-
tant to overstate the role we 
played, although the negotia-
tions did foreshadow much of 
what was eventually codified in 
law in the "big bang." We were 
most successful when we picked 
issues that had substantial 
domestic support for change. 
Q: You commented that the 
Japanese financial system should 
not create global imbalances. 
But with 3.7 percent inflation, 
many would argue that the 
largest source of global imbal-
ance is the United States. 
G e i t h n e r : The greatest 
prospects for a favorable adjust-
ment of global imbalances lie in 
narrowing the significant gap 
between potential growth rates 
in the United States, Japan, and 
Europe. Most economists would 
say that U.S. potential growth is 
now approximately 3.5 percent, 
Europe's is 2.5 percent, Japan's is 
1.5 percent. This disparity will 
be quite costly to the world 
going forward. It would be best 
if a narrowing occurred through 
sustained improvement of over-
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